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doI had not acquired the habit, so common [. . .]
of ignoring the real world when it contradicts
the theory.
Herbert Simon1. Introduction
We have to go back to the beginning of mo-
dernity, somewhere between the Renaissance and
the Enlightenment of the 18th century, a time when
the predominance of the so-called scientific rea-
soning came to determine the relationship between
Man and Nature, to position the origins of the
classical paradigm of operational research. How-
ever, truth has been more than a simple act of faith
since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, and thus theE-mail address: jclimaco@inescc.pt (J.C.N. Clımaco).
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will, to the free and enterprising subject. Deci-
sion came to be under the tutelage of Man alone.
It is clear that the historical process is not linear.
Let us not forget that, while Galileo remained
on the Index until a few years ago, in the 17th
century the missionaries of the Society of Jesus
were teaching Copernicuss system to the Chi-
nese.
In short, the new relationship between Nature,
Man and Freedom characterised classical rational
thinking. As Lenoble (1969):
Freedom is claimed in the name of Nature.
[. . .] But, at the same time, Nature is increas-
ingly more strictly determined for the physi-
cist, for the chemist, for the biologist. [. . .]
Nature determined and Freedom as a gift of
Nature: this is the paradox which will bother
modern thinking for a long time to come.ed.
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Whether man is free or simply an irresponsi-
ble link of universal determinism, the result
is the same: he behaves as though he was mas-
ter of his fate, as dAlembert remarked
The Cartesian view left an indelible mark on
scientific method that is still with us. Utility and
comfort are central ideas, particularly in the cur-
rents that are still dominant in Economics today,
in decision theory in organisations and in opera-
tional research. Bacon and Descartes had already
associated utility and comfort with the idea of
scientific progress (Salomon, 1992).
In classical operational research, the prefer-
ences of the agents of decision are modelled a
priori, starting from the principle that the model
will be, in the Platonic sense, a faithful description
of reality. It is supposed that in constructing the
model the analyst has full information and is ra-
tional. All the values appear condensed into a
single utility function, the monetary unit of mea-
surement being adopted. Provided certain axiom-
atic presuppositions, the optimum is considered to
be objectively true and of free will. What is re-
quired in particular is the independence of the al-
ternatives in relation to the others and the basic
principles of the paradigm of optimality, that is,
the ability to establish a total pre-order in the set
of alternatives. In situations of probabilistic un-
certainty, the general archetype does not change,
and is much used in operational research, in mi-
croeconomics and in subjective expected utility
theory.
Our aim is to discuss some of the ideological
and pragmatic consequences of the current ratio-
nal model and to point out some attempts to
overcome it in the area of operational research.
However, it is first necessary to discuss its intrinsic
limitations, at least in brief. As a choice based on
the optimisation of a utility function is a particular
case of the rational model, we will begin by men-
tioning some of its most important generic aspects,
with a view to questioning the evolutionary pro-
cess of operational research later. Sfez (1992) deals
with this matter in great depth in Critique de la
decision. In this work he begins by discussing thelinear character of rational decision, in which the
most important point is the fragmentation of de-
cisions. Decomposition of systems is inevitable in
the modern scientific method, but implies, fatally,
that interactions between the parts are scorned.
This becomes an important limitation when one
aims to study and, perhaps, support decisions in
complex systems. To overcome this, methodolo-
gies of a holistic or systemic nature have been
proposed. These methods are, in our opinion,
complementary to operational research rather
than alternatives. Note that fragmentation of the
political system is one of the essential character-
istics of the Nation-State, the base of classical
liberalism, and it ensures the separation and bal-
ance of powers. We do not go into this topic here.
However, it must be noted that the organisation
and foundations of the Nation-State, which
emerged from the 18th century with the Enlight-
enment and the bourgeois revolutions, survived
until the present, but are in crisis today. If this
happens, it is for reasons of a systemic nature
connected with the globalisation of the world-
system. Second, the modern rational decision is
mono-rational and social reality is clearly pluri-
rational. This perspective opens the promising way
for prospective research into possible alternative
futures, based on essentially qualitative method-
ologies, but perfectly compatible with a new open
vision of operational research. Third, there are
philosophical questions about Freedom. Anyway,
for our aims it is enough to take into account that
a decision is, as somebody said, associated with a
process, and may therefore be described as ‘‘a
warmer tempo’’ for that process.
Finally, some more relevant specific reflections
on utility theory:
• The psychologists Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), among others, showed that human be-
haviour in the act of choosing diverges from
subjective expected utility theory. This observa-
tion has several consequences, especially in neo-
classical economics;
• The study of particular situations gave rise to
paradoxes that have become famous in the spe-
cialitys literature, such as the Allais Para-
dox (see Allais and Hangen, 1979). In these
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the expected results;
• Arrows famous Impossibility Theorem (Arrow,
1963) shows that it is not viable to group indi-
vidual utility functions together in a single func-
tion of ‘‘social welfare’’; and
• Wierzbicki (1994) draws attention to the follow-
ing fact: In assuming that utility functions can
describe the preferences of decision agents,
i.e., that ‘‘real rational decisions are always
made in the best perceived interests of the deci-
sion maker, this assumption is itself not rational
in the normative, Popperian sense of the theory
of science. Popper uses precisely the utility the-
ory as an example of an irrefutable theory’’
There is much more to be said. However, I am
going to leave this matter for now, to return to it
later when I defend a constructivist attitude to
decision support, as a way of overcoming the
weaknesses of the descriptive attitude, namely in
utility theory. Our intention is not only to confront
models of utility with a constructive attitude to
decision support, but also, and principally, to de-
fend the thesis that the constructive approach can
be embodied in models and systems to provide
effective decision support in very complex situa-
tions in the real world.
In the history of civilizations, energy, informa-
tion and communications have always been de-
termining factors in political, economic and social
organization. The fantastic development of these
domains, especially after the Industrial Revolution
of the 18th and 19th centuries, has not stopped
growing to this day, creating suitable conditions
for the birth of globalisation. Mans dominion
over Nature today is overwhelming. The capacities
of the new technologies are fantastic, with impli-
cations in the most diverse domains of human
action, from information technology to biotech-
nologies, from robotics to communications, from
energy to space technologies, apparently creating
conditions for all men to be able to live in a dig-
nified way. However, poverty has not been eradi-
cated in the least favoured countries, and, even in
the rich countries of the West, there is a legion of
newly excluded people. The inequality between
rich and poor has doubled in the last thirty years.According to United Nations and World Bank
data, technological unemployment, precariousness
of employment, health risks caused by toxic waste
and other industrial waste, the inferno of city
traffic, the destruction of fauna and flora and, as a
result, of biodiversity, have continued to increase.
Natural disasters, connected with the action of
Man, have also multiplied. Many of them have
presumably been caused by climatic alterations:
pollution of the air, water, the sea, recommenda-
tions to protect ourselves from sunlight because of
the hole in the ozone layer, etc. We live in a time
when uncertainty and complexity predominate.
The positions of specialists and educated men are
at opposite extremes: on the one hand, there are
those who foretell the best of all worlds, as the
current difficulties are transient problems, which
can be perfectly solved by the system (the Green
Revolution will resolve all the problems of hunger,
Nuclear Energy those of power shortages, the PC
and the Internet will bring knowledge and infor-
mation to every home); on the other hand, there
are those who point to the inevitability of de-
struction and civilisational catastrophe. We have
no doubt that it is impossible for a clear-headed
citizen not to have moments of pessimism, and
that the compulsive optimists, consciously or un-
consciously cloud the issues and are the messen-
gers of the owners of a globalised world, who want
nothing changed.
In this article we discuss some questions raised
by the technological risks associated to the
globalised world to motivate a reflection on the
optimal decisions, in the framework of the classical
operational research. It is based on part of an
English version of the Inaugural Speech at the
Universidade de Coimbra, on 18 October 2000.
The original speech was published in Clımaco
(2001).2. Management technological risks
The technological risk is associated with the
global society. A technological risk which has
worried men for many generations. For example,
Francis Bacon in Novum Organum (1620), quoted
in Lenoble (1969) had already posed the question:
J.C.N. Clımaco / European Journal of Operational Research 153 (2004) 506–516 509The use of firearms has become general. Is it
not to be feared that with the progress of sci-
ence, and the hand of Man on Nature, the dis-
coveries may not come to be used for
nefarious ends?
It was Bacon himself who calmed himself next,
writing:
It can be hoped that good habits and religion
will guide Man in the use of his power. Still
more, his own interests will impose a certain
prudence. The States will reach an under-
standing to limit the use of dangerous discov-
eries, and the chancellor of England already
predicts the holding of an international con-
ference prohibiting the use of firearms.
Simply, this prudence, proclaimed a thousand
times, has never existed, and the current situation
is much more complex and dangerous. In the
global society there are megalopolises of an un-
controllable size and gigantic production units,
many natural resources are almost exhausted and
technology is increasingly more complex and so-
phisticated. If, to be absurd, we accept that it may
become possible to build completely safe ma-
chines, this would not solve the problem, because
there are always human operators, and the Man/
machine binomial involves unavoidable risks (on
this subject see Lagadec (1981)). As Beck (1992)
says: ‘‘in advanced modernity the social produc-
tion of wealth is systematically accompanied by
the social production of risks’’. We all know of
large-scale accidents, some with only local reper-
cussions, others with consequences that do not
respect territorial boundaries. Remember, for ex-
ample, the rain with toxic dioxins on Seveso in
1977, caused by a large-scale chemical accident
and the fusion of the core of one of the reactors at
the Chernobyl nuclear power station in 1986, with
more serious implications for the surrounding re-
gion, but with transnational consequences thou-
sands of kilometers away.
There are risks of diverse types and amplitudes,
and perhaps those where the likelihood of occur-
rence is very low and the consequences are of an
incalculable dimension should be stressed. An-other category of risks occurs to me, one that is
very little spoken of, at least seriously, but which
we cannot fail to mention. We mean the risks we
leave for future generations, caused by current
technical options, the transgenerational risks.
In this paper, the discussion is limited, in a ge-
neric way, to the decision procedures with which
issues of technological risk are associated, without
even the intention to refer separately to the cases
of prevention and those of risk management. First,
it is necessary to be aware that the perception of
the actors involved depends on diverse factors,
that is, the interests at stake, the frequency of ac-
cidents, the treatment they are given by the in-
formative entities, the type and size of the
equipment, the materials involved, etc. This ap-
plies to all the actors––to the citizens who may be
affected and their organisations, to political agents
and experts. Furthermore, decision procedures of
this type raise difficulties of a varying nature which
must be analysed. Let us begin with a question,
which may be unrealistic from the pragmatic point
of view, but is very real in the essence of things.
The peoples should be masters of their techno-
logical fate. Inevitable risks on the model of
western society, as we know it, are not an inevi-
tability of Nature, as they would sometimes make
us believe. They may be unavoidable if we want to
maintain our current lifestyle. The question lies in
knowing whether we have the opportunity to say
‘‘No’’. Obviously we do not, for several reasons.
The words of one of todays politicians are very
eloquent when he says ‘‘We have to choose be-
tween a potential nuclear catastrophe, using the
power station after it has been repaired, and a
certain economic catastrophe if we close it’’ (Sal-
omon, 1992). We cannot hope for a swift altera-
tion of this situation, but small giant strides could
and should be taken. The first has to do with the
autonomy of citizens (Castoriadis, 2000), that is,
with their capacity for intervention in the life of
the community and the strength that effectively
well-informed public opinion would have. Second,
we believe that the politico-legal system could also
help. For example, is it allowable that decisions on
the realisation of megaprojects, with implications
for the future life of peoples, should be taken by
simple majorities in parliaments? Let us think
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clear power stations. It is impossible, with current
knowledge, to say even approximately how many
generations will be affected by a decision of this
kind.
Let us now move on to the difficulties more
directly related to decision procedures, which
specifically involve issues of technological risk.
First, there is the enormous technological com-
plexity of much of todays equipment. For exam-
ple, in large systems, designed to perform more
than one task, which include subsystems with very
strong connections, there are often unexpected
interactions. In many cases these are non-linear,
and are therefore impossible for the operator to
predict. Charles Perrow calls our attention to the
potential danger of these cases, and presents an
eloquent illustrative example:
In 1977 New York City experience a massive
and very costly blackout. One key contribu-
tion to the accident was an operators expecta-
tion about the default reading for current
flowing over a particular line. Normally that
line carried little or no current. The operator
did not know there had been two relay fail-
ures – one that automatically lead to a high
flow of current over that line; and a second
that blocked the flow over the line. The oper-
ator treated the zero current as normal. In
fact, it was abnormal, but only in this partic-
ular set of circumstances. This ambiguity led
to a systematic, by-the-book sequence of ac-
tions to handle the problems that were show-
ing up in other parts of the system, ending in
the system being brought to a halt’’. (Perrow,
1999)
Another classic difficulty has to do with the
problem of equity, a determining factor in assess-
ing whether a project is politically acceptable. For
example, when deciding where to site potentially
dangerous equipment which, as is well known,
unleashes the not in my back yard (NIMBY)
syndrome, one of the politically and ethically most
important criteria is equity with regard to the
population. But measuring this equity is far from
simple, even considering only the technical aspects.As French et al. (1997) noted, based on the expe-
rience acquired from participating in an European
project,
the equity is not just a matter of defining a fair
distribution of risk over a population of indi-
viduals. The fair distribution of risks over
subpopulations (here villages) also needs to
be considered. For this we shall need concepts
of dispersive equity . . .
Equity raises many other issues, but I do not
believe we need to linger on them, so obvious are
the sensitivity and difficulty of the problem. In
processes of this type, the decision is always po-
litical, and we do not believe that any kind of
delegation of competencies is politically legitimate.
The final decision brings together fatally diverse
controversial factors: there is no optimal solution.
Public participation and the opinions and expla-
nations of the experts are of the greatest impor-
tance in enabling the political power to assume its
responsibilities in a properly informed way, facing
risks and perhaps incomprehension of the final
choice, leaning on the legitimacy conferred by the
popular vote. For the process to be serious, it is
essential to create conditions for effective public
consultation, that is, for a critical reflection on the
matter in question, which is only possible if the
process is constantly monitored and there is open
information, namely, discussion of the pros and
cons of the viable alternatives. Popular interven-
tion should not come down to impassioned and
impulsive positions, charged with emotion. Such
positions are very respectable, but show that we
are still far from living in advanced democracies,
even when the regimes in question are formally
democratic. Let us point out two significant ex-
amples.
Everyone remembers that after the Chernobyl
accident the fields of several countries were con-
taminated with radioactive substances, putting
principally milk and fresh vegetables at risk.
Michele Rivasi relates, in a very interesting article
(Rivasi, 1992), an episode that took place in
France. At the time, it was reported in the media
that France had been protected from the radiation
by an anticyclone. In a certain area the population
J.C.N. Clımaco / European Journal of Operational Research 153 (2004) 506–516 511did not believe this, and organised themselves,
bringing in specialists to clarify the situation. After
a relatively complicated process, they finally con-
cluded that without an independent laboratory it
was impossible to contradict the official version.
This laboratory was set up, and the first study it
carried out was precisely on the impact of the ex-
plosion at Chernobyl. Several hotspots were de-
tected in the eastern part of the map of France.
Michele Rivasi points out that this is ‘‘a reality far
from the averages made public by the official de-
partments’’.
The second case is discussed in detail by Gust-
erson (2000) of MIT, and concerns the decision
procedure, which took place between 1988 and
1990, relating to a nuclear waste incinerator to be
built in Livermore, California. In the end the in-
cinerator was not built, but the notable thing
about the process is the professionalism with
which the discussions were conducted in the public
audiences, where each party in the dispute had a
separate team of experts. As is obvious, there was
also a lot of emotion and rhetoric, but this did not
prevent the matter being studied and discussed
throughout by those who argued against, which is,
without doubt, a significant advance in the func-
tioning of the democratic process. It is essential to
create a minimum of confidence between the po-
litical power, the citizens and the experts, and in
this aspect the political power and the experts have
an added responsibility. Controversy helps to
clarify positions, but a total lack of confidence
impedes a calm and serious discussion. The citi-
zens autonomy is also indispensable. Only people
who are informed and able to mix words with the
experts and politicians can ever be full-bodied
citizens in an increasingly complex society which
requires the various options and their conse-
quences to be studied in depth and clearly.
Furthermore, the expert inspection must be
plural and explanatory. Physicists, chemists, bio-
logists, sociologists, psychologists, economists,
jurists, doctors etc. should give well-founded
opinions. These opinions are essential, but, for
various reasons, cannot be considered objective
truths, nor even total and definitive. Herbert Si-
mon tells us of an experience regarding this. He
wrote:More than ten years ago, when two techni-
cians at the Livermore laboratories improp-
erly published some statistics that showed
that the health risks resulting from the radia-
tion immediately around the power stations
were substantially greater than had been ini-
tially thought, the first reactions of the people
connected with nuclear energy was to close
ranks. Apart from some honourable excep-
tions, they did not say: ‘‘Lets look at this
more closely. Lets nominate a committee of
specialists to check the facts. On the con-
trary, the almost unanimous reaction was:
‘‘Why did these irresponsible people decide
to open their mouths?’’ I had the opportunity
to find out about these facts as a member of
the Presidential Consultative Committee for
the Sciences and I remember, na€ıvely, being
surprised by the insensitivity of those ‘‘re-
sponsible people’’, given the depth of pub-
lic concern. Many of these people were my
friends or acquaintances, people of high integ-
rity, people whose honesty I do not doubt.
What prevented them from seeing the need
for an impartial analysis of the facts was the
‘‘knowledge’’ they had acquired over ten
years, working on the development of nuclear
energy; the conviction that this new tech-
nology was good for Humanity . . . (Simon
(1989). This quotation was retranslated to En-
glish from a Portuguese edition of the original
text).
When a problem becomes highly controversial,
when it is surrounded by uncertainties and conflicts
of values, it is very difficult to arrange experts, and
even more so to acknowledge their legitimacy. The
preconceived ideas of some technicians and politi-
cians are another of the pieces of this complicated
jigsaw. Pfeffer (1992) observes that, in many of lifes
circumstances, the experts perform the service of
hired guns for company directors or for politicians,
justifying preconceived decisions ‘‘scientifically’’.
Finally, a legal appreciation is needed, given that
there is increasingly more national or international
legislation that intervenes in this material. This
makes it essential to make a correct assessment of
which options are unequivocally legitimate from
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can legitimately make the decision. Social practice,
which may or may not validate the laws and mix
diverse knowledge and experiences, is perhaps an-
other small step towards recognition of new rights
(Ramonet, 2000), such as the right to protected
nature or the right to a humanised city. However,
in todays world, the utilitarian mono-rational
ideology seems to be in good health, which will at
least retard the progress towards more humanised
societies. The ‘‘fatal attraction of the optimal’’ is
above all else an ideological image of this view of
the world. In other words, let us see: to celebrate
Humanitys entry into the year 2000, the New York
Times decided to issue a special publication dedi-
cated to ‘‘The Best of the Millennium’’. Included in
this supplement was an article by Frank Rich en-
titled ‘‘Better, Why?’’, where he says at a given
stage:
We tend to forget that almost all our notions
for measuring, cataloguing and quantifying
the best are relatively recent... It was in the
20th century, and especially in the American
20th century, that our incessant thirst for clas-
sifying almost everything became a cultural
undertaking that reaches obsession . . . The
impulse that drives us to make lists and cata-
logues of the Best is very understandable at
this fin de siecle. We live in a time when the
volume of what we know about the Universe
is more than we can absorb, and the desperate
desire to understand has been one of our anx-
ieties for thousands of years . . . Do not be
surprised that we cling more than ever to
the idea of the Best––as an anchor and radar
simultaneously, even if there is more disagree-
ment about what it means than ever (Rich
(1999)). This quotation was retranslated to
English from a Portuguese edition of the orig-
inal text.
Decision theory and classical operational re-
search have also been developing optimisation
models dedicated to the problems of risk. The best
known are based on Cost–Benefit Analysis, and
are therefore models that aim to minimise a utility
function that supposedly groups various dimen-sions of risk. It is assumed that uncertainty is
probabilistic and risk is estimated by Statistical
Inference, aiming to model physical, chemical and
biological aspects. Other mathematical models
have been proposed, but with no alteration to the
paradigm, for example, the Event Trees, which
make use of the Bayess Theorem, and which can
incorporate subjective estimates. As in neo-classi-
cal economics, the advances consist of complicat-
ing the utility model to include new aspects of
reality. Of the many improvements proposed, the
attempts to integrate psychological issues such as
aversion to risk, for example, stand out. However,
the descriptive models of optimisation de per se
are, in our opinion, inadequate to prescribe deci-
sions in complex problems, as is the case of tech-
nological risk.
Edgar Morin writes, in La methode:
If optimisation involves the inclusion of disor-
der, uncertainties, speculations, competition,
and antagonisms, then such an optimisation
involves the unoptimisable . . . (Morin, 1980).3. From the classical operational research to deci-
sion aiding
Attempts to overcome the optimising rationale,
designated absolute rationale by Perrow (1999), go
back to the fifties, the time when Simon (1957,
1960), later awarded the Nobel Prize for econom-
ics, broke with the paradigm of optimality in his
studies on decision in organisations, for reasons
of an essentially cognitive nature. He concluded
that the rationality of human beings is limited, for
reasons that go beyond the specific characteris-
tics of each individual, that is, because the mind
works in a sequential way, by making compari-
sons. In these circumstances, he proposes that
satisfaction should replace optimality, or rather,
he considers that human beings, if they need to
solve a problem, accept a solution when they judge
it to be satisfactory. Some years later, operational
research strengthened the course of overcoming
the paradigm of optimality; it is fair to point out
Russell Ackoff as a precursor in the United States
and a group of personalities in England, of whom
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that operational research has profound cognitive,
social, political and ethical implications. It is
therefore intimately interlaced with psychology,
economics, political science and sociology. The
evolution has been diversified and, in my opinion,
the most promising School at present is based on a
constructivist attitude, materialised by Roy (1985,
1999) in the so-called decision aiding science. It
corresponds to a recent development in opera-
tional research, which has come to be located in a
hinge position between mathematics and the social
sciences.
Despite all these recent victories, it should be
noted that the use of informal models dedicated to
supporting human beings in building convictions
has been known and practiced for a long time. A
famous letter that Benjamin Franklin wrote to a
friend is an eloquent example. He says:
In the affair of so much importance to you,
where in you ask my advice, I cannot, for
want of sufficient premises, advise you what
to determine, but if you please I will tell you
how. When those difficult cases occur, they
are difficult, chiefly because while we have
them under consideration, all the reasons
pro and con are not present to the mind at
the same time . . . To get over this, my way
is to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into
two columns; writing over the one pro, and
over the other con. Then, during three or four
days consideration, I put down under the dif-
ferent heads short hints of the different mo-
tives, that at different times occur to me, for
or against the measure. When I have thus
got them all together in one view, I endeav-
our to estimate their respective weights. (apud
Zeleny, 1982)
Next, Franklin refers in detail to a simplifica-
tion procedure for eliminating contrasting argu-
ments, which, in his opinion, cancel each other
out. Finally, he describes the process of choice in
the following terms:
I come to a determination accordingly. And,
though the precision of algebraic quantities,yet when each is thus considered, separately
and comparatively, and the whole lies before
me, I think I can judge better, . . . and in fact
I have found great advantage from this kind of
equation, and what might be called moral or
prudential algebra. (apud Zeleny, 1982)
Benjamin Franklin is clearly aware of two is-
sues, which are essential for building decision
support models. First, he identifies the difficulty of
concentrating on several matters simultaneously,
that is, he recognizes that the attention, while be-
ing one of the great weapons of human beings, is
also one of their main limitations. Furthermore, he
uses a multidimensional model to study the prob-
lem, and tries to estimate a set of weights, but he
avoids a simple aggregation of weighted sums for
the final choice, preferring to combine the multi-
criterial analysis with his own experience and in-
tuition. These are important lessons for the studies
that are currently in progress in the field of deci-
sion support. As was said earlier, Bernard Roy
considers that we are facing a rising science, deci-
sion aiding science. In recent decades, there have
been studies and discussions on its validation, that
is, on the possibility of instituting minimal condi-
tions for verification and critical discussion. It is
also Bernard Roy who describes it as follows:
. . . the goal of Decision Aiding (DA) is not
to set forth objective truths. Rather more
modestly, DA aims at establishing, on recog-
nized scientific bases, with reference to work-
ing hypotheses, formulations of propositions
(elements of responses to questions, a presen-
tation of satisfying solutions or possible com-
promises . . .) which are then submitted to the
judgment of a decision maker and/or the var-
ious actors involved in the decision-making
process. In order to accomplish this goal,
DA draws its support from models. These
models are not necessarily (more or less sim-
plified) descriptions of hard-liner reality. We
could imagine, for example, the preferences
that one of the actors might have in mind rel-
ative to numerous potential actions with
very complex ensuing consequences. These
preferences might evolve under the influence
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other actors. Which is to say that the role of
decision-aiding is not to discover hidden
truths, but rather to contribute to construct-
ing individual convictions, collective decisions
and compromises between multiple, and often
conflicting, rationalities, stakes and value . . .
DA cannot claim to unify or synthesize these
systems of values, logical approaches to deal
with information, rationalities or the founda-
tions of legitimacy when two or more clash
within the same decision-aiding process. Nev-
ertheless, in a certain number of cases, DA
should allow participants to structure debate
and facilitate concertation, especially by help-
ing to establish a climate of confidence and by
providing a common understanding of the
problem. (Roy, 1999)
That is, decision aiding science may lead to
actions with prescriptive characteristics or simply
advisory actions, depending on the circumstances.
It is an attitude which frames the decision proce-
dures, in a constructivist view, ‘‘based on clearly
explained, but not necessarily formalized, models’’
(Roy, 1985). In this case, the help does not consist
of showing the agent of decision or the various
actors involved the course to follow, but rather of
constructing a set of coherent recommendations
that contribute to the clarification of the process.
Thus, the goals and values of the decision maker(s)
do not run the risk of being replaced by any old
calculated rationale. Now, this methodological
perspective is not so very far from the ideas of
Michel Croizier, when he draws attention to the
social character of limited rationality:
Limited rationality is constructed by Man. Its
limits do not appear by chance. They are de-
veloped and established from the game of
human relationships within complex systems
which have their own characteristics and reg-
ulations. (Croizier, 1983)
Perrow (1999) argues in the same way, desig-
nating this multilimited rationality by social and
cultural rationality.Conceptually, decision aiding science, permits,
or even incorporates, both quantitative and qual-
itative models in assisting agents of decision, with
a large spectrum of options, from the traditional
models of Optimisation, to Statistical Inference, to
the techniques of Artificial Intelligence, to the
Cognitive Maps, imported from Psychology, and
used with considerable success in the structuring of
decision problems, etc. It is important to stress
that the models of optimisation, for example, here
play the part of a support tool, and are therefore
only suitable for proposing a solution to the
problem in question de per se in special cases.
In recent years, multicriteria models, group de-
cision models and negotiation models have un-
dergone great development, and, in many cases, are
models rooted in constructivism. Obviously, they
tackle questions that are very relevant in many
decision processes. In particular, we cannot forget
that negotiation is present in many real world
cases, yet was ignored by operational research for
decades. Use of multicriteria models lets us avoid
one of the essential issues that has followed us
throughout, that issue being the aggregation of the
preferences of agents of decision in a single crite-
rion, reducing everything to just one measure,
usually in monetary units. Some multicriteria ap-
proaches propose the combination of algorithmic
protocols with the experience and intuition of
agents of decision in the process of preference ag-
gregation. But, even if only formalized procedures
are used to aggregate preferences, these are gener-
ally interactive, and need not be compensatory.
Obviously, aggregation always implies loss of in-
formation, which means special care is needed.
New technologies allow very flexible interac-
tive decision support systems to be constructed,
which makes it easier to put a constructivist view
of operational research into practice. In addition,
these decision support systems can even be used
symbiotically with wider-ranging tools of a sys-
temic nature, or with qualitative prospective ana-
lyses. Croizier (1983) recognises that operational
research is established as a particular case of ac-
tion methodology, and we add that the construc-
tivist approach is blurring the borders between
various levels of this methodology.
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have to be used with great caution. There is no
doubt that ‘‘arithmomorphism’’ (Roy, 1999) must
be fought. However, there is an essential pre-con-
dition for this––we must study carefully the
quantitative models and methods, so that we can
understand their potentials, and their limitations
too. In science it is crucial to avoid making ex-
trapolations that go beyond the possibilities of the
models used. On the other hand, it can be said that
open decision support systems, which can integrate
quantitative and qualitative models, and perhaps
the actors experience and intuition about the de-
cision process, have not been found to be efficient.
On these matters it is advisable to remember a
sentence from Einstein (apud Haimes, 1997):
So far as the theorems of mathematics are
about reality, they are not certain; so far as
they are certain, they are not about reality.
That is, reality is integral, it involves complex
social processes, and therefore the synergies be-
tween different scientific areas will help us to under-
stand it, so that we can intervene better. There are
cases in which the use of mathematical models re-
solves decision problems by itself, but they are rare,
especially when dealing with complex problems.Acknowledgements
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